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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DeBRY AND HILTON TRAVEL 
SERVICES, INC., 
Plaintiff and 
llant, Appell 
v. 
CAPITOL INTERNATIONAL 
AIRWAYS, INC., 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Case No. 14335 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Appellant DeBry and Hilton Travel Services, Inc. (hereinafter termed "Appel-
lant") is a travel agent - broker. Defendant-Respondent Capitol International Airways, Inc., 
(hereinafter termed "Respondent") is a charter airline. Appellant claims a five per cent (5%) 
brokerage commission pursuant to an oral brokerage contract between Appellant and 
Respondent in connection with the sale of over $1,500,000 of charter flights procured and 
sold by Appellant for Respondent, which brokerage commission Respondent has refused 
to pay. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT 
Following a non-jury trial based primarily upon a stipulation of the parties, the trial court 
entered judgment in favor of Respondent and against Appellant, no cause of action, and 
awarded Respondent its costs. 
Respondent filed a Counterclaim which was withdrawn during the trial. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment and entry of a judgment in its favor and against 
Respondent for the sum of $78,401.48, and Appellant's costs. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant is a corporation generally engaged in the sale and promotion of travel. Such 
activities involve the negotiation and sale of charter flights and the marketing of vacation 
tours generally, including the sale of airplane tickets, hotel reservations and the like. From 
time to time, Appellant sells air transportation to large groups. Instead of buying individual 
airplane tickets, such large groups (or group tour operators) often charter an entire airplane. 
(R. 813; Tr. 15) 
Respondent is a charter airline. This means that Respondent does not sell individual tickets. 
Respondent only sells charter flights to qualified or charterworthy groups. (R. 808) 
In order to solicit such charter business, Respondent advertises extensively to travel agents. 
From 1967-1974 Respondent spent approximately $2,793,600 for advertisements in travel 
agent trade journals and in direct mailings to travel agents. (R. 809) In addition to these 
published advertisements, Respondent has a staff of approximately 50-60 full time sales 
personnel. (R. 809) 
The purpose of the advertising and sales effort of Respondent is to get travel agents to 
utilize Respondent's services or to go to customers and try to get them to form charter groups 
to be transported on Respondent's airplanes. (R. 809) The travel agent is not the purchaser of 
the charter flight. Customarily, the travel agent negotiates the contract between the airline 
and the travel group. The travel agent acts in the capacity of a broker or middleman. (R. 813; 
Tr. 15, 16) 
The travel agent's only compensation for selling such charter flights is a commission of 5% 
of the charter paid directly by the airline to the travel agent. This 5% commission is standard 
and customary throughout the air charter industry. (R. 809, 810; Tr. 21) 
The negotiation of a charter flight takes place in various stages. The travel agent first screens 
the potential charter user to determine whether the user is charterworthy and whether the 
needs and requirements of the charter user such as destination, number of people, etc., can 
be met(R. 808; Tr. 17) The travel agent next tries to match the needs of the charter user with 
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a particular charter airline, i.e., size of the airplane, authority of the airline to fly to a particular 
destination and otherwise plans and schedules the ground packages, including hotels, trans-
portation and the like. The travel agent next circulates the charter user's requirements to those 
air carriers which are qualified and interested in the tour. The circulation of the charter user's 
requirements to various airlines is frequently done orally. (Tr. 18) A charter airline on occasion 
receives requests from several travel agents for the same flights. (R. 810) From the time of the 
initial contact by the charter user until bids on the particular flights are received by the travel 
agent, a substantial period of up to four months may elapse. The actual charter departure 
date may be as much as a year following the initial contact between the travel agent and 
charter user. (Tr. 21) 
One of the most critical negotiations undertaken by the travel agent concerns deposits that 
are required by the airline to charter the airplanes. These deposits may equal 10% of the 
charter price and part of the travel agent's function is to negotiate the amount of such deposits 
to comply with the requirements of the particular airline and the ability of the charter user to 
pay such deposits. (Tr. 20) 
In February of 1973, Appellant became acquainted with Prestige Vacations, a group tour 
operator (charter user) (hereinafter termed "Prestige"). Prestige requested Appellant to find 
and arrange a series of charter flights. (R. 816, 819, 825) According to the instructions of 
Prestige and according to the custom of the industry, Appellant sought bids from several 
different airlines, including Respondent. (R. 810) At the time Appellant introduced Prestige 
to Respondent, Respondent had never even heard of Prestige. (Ex. P-2, P-3) 
Following this introduction, Appellant and Respondent had a conversation about the 
Prestige account. The substance of that conversation was a request by Appellant for Respon-
dent to bid on the Prestige flights.(R. 816; Tr. 34)Respondent agreed to quote on the Prestige 
flights and to pay a 5% commission to Appellant if the flights were sold and if Prestige would 
sign a document termed a "Charter Agency Agreement" (Ex. D-51), making Appellant the 
agent of record. (R. 819, 825) 
Sometime thereafter Appellant had other conversations with Respondent. Appellant 
expressed concern about what would happen if Prestige went behind Appellant's back to 
negotiate directly with Respondent. Respondent assured Appellant that Respondent always 
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protects the agent. Respondent further stated that if a customer should ever come directly to 
the airline, Respondent would "always quote the full gross price"; and that, " we (Respondent) 
would never give them (customer) the 5% commission or we (Respondent) would never quote 
to them (customer) the price minus the 5% commission." (Tr. 42-43, 216-217) 
After these preliminary discussions, Appellant negotiated a series of charter flight contracts 
between Respondent and Prestige. These negotiations took place more or less concurrently. 
For convenience, each series of flights is referred to separately as a "flight chain". A synopsis 
of relevant negotiations follows: 
1. Chain "A" Transaction 
Following the request of Prestige for charter flights, Appellant made various requests for 
quotations to Respondent on or about April 20, 1973 and to other charter airlines. Thereafter, 
Respondent quoted prices for the Chain "A" flights to Appellant, including the requirement 
that a $2,000.00 deposit would be required for each flight. (R. 818) Prestige paid the required 
deposit directly to Respondent and eventually five of the six contracted flights were flown. 
(R. 818) 
The charter for the Chain "A" flights was arranged by Appellant with Respondent even 
though negotiations with another charter airline which quoted prices for the charter flights 
slightly lower than Respondent's prices were presented to Prestige. On April 27, 1973, Respon-
dent called Prestige directly and urged Prestige to use Respondent's services even at the 
higher prices, which Prestige agreed to do. (R. 817; Tr. 34) After the charter had been arranged 
and agreed to by the parties, Respondent sent its standard form which is termed a "Charter 
Agency Agreement" to Appellant with instructions to "[pjlease sign this so we can process 
your (Appellant's) five per cent commission." (Tr. 34) These instructions were complied with 
and the charter agency agreement was signed by the parties. (Ex. D-51) 
Notwithstanding the execution of the charter agency agreement on October 9, 1973, during 
the negotiations of the Chain "C" and Chain "D" flights, Prestige wrote to Respondent 
instructing Respondent to "freeze" the commissions for the Chain "A" flights. (R. 818; Ex. 
D-43) That action was initiated by Prestige as the result of a suit commenced by Appellant 
against Prestige which suit was subsequently settled on February 27, 1974 prior to the trial of 
the instant case. The consideration for such settlement was the delivery of Respondent's check 
to Appellant, which check represented the agent's commission of five per cent of the charter Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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price of the Chain "A" flights. (R. 818; Ex. D-53) Appellant asserts no claim in connection 
with commissions from the Chain "A" flights against Respondent. (R. 818) 
2. Chain "B" Transaction 
Appellant makes no claim against Respondent in connection with the single Chain "B" 
flight. 
3. Chain "C" Transaction 
In April and May of 1973 Prestige requested Appellant to negotiate charter contracts for a 
series of charter flights to be flown to Jamaica during the winter/spring of 1974. (R. 819) 
Appellant sent the Prestige request to a number of airlines including Respondent. (R. 819) 
Prior to receiving the requests from Appellant, Respondent had not at any time received any 
independent or direct request from Prestige for the same flights. (R. 819) Thereafter, there 
followed a series of "routine" phone calls between Appellant, Prestige and Respondent to 
coordinate the Prestige request. (R. 821) During all of these negotiations Prestige made it 
clear to Respondent that they (Prestige) intended to use Appellant as "agent" for their (Pres-
tige's) future flights. (R. 820) 
Appellant spent a substantial amount of time in negotiations concerning the Chain "C" 
flights. (Tr. 45) Included among the items of negotiation conducted by Appellant was the 
matter of the deposit that might be required in connection with the Chain "C" charter with 
Respondent and other airlines. (Tr. 45) Appellant negotiated the deposit amount from $2,000 
per flight to $750 per flight which resulted in the securing of the Chain "C" charter business 
for Respondent. (R. 822; Tr. 45, 46) 
After the charter negotiations had begun, Appellant and Prestige entered into separate 
negotiations on the possibility of a merger of the two organizations. (R. 820) One term of the 
proposed merger was that Appellant would advance the deposits to cover Prestige's airplane 
charters. (R. 822) 
Respondent brought the charter quotation to Salt Lake City to present to Appellant. 
(R. 821) Respondent prepared certain working documents for the Salt Lake City meeting 
which designated Appellant as "agent" in connection with such flights. (Ex. P-47, P-52) 
At the meeting in Salt Lake City, Utah, there was complete agreement on the price and 
terms for the charter flights. The primary topic of discussion was who could pay the required 
deposit of $13,500, Appellant or Prestige. (R. 822) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Historically, Prestige had always paid its own deposits. (R. 818) However, Prestige expected 
Appellant to pay the deposits for the Chain "C" flights as part of the merger. Nevertheless, 
the merger negotiations broke down and as a result, Appellant refused to advance to Respon-
dent the deposits for Prestige. (R. 822) Prestige even attempted to borrow the amount of the 
deposit from Appellant, which Appellant likewise refused because the proposed merger was 
not completed. (Tr. 92) Although the merger negotiations had broken down, the relationship 
between Appellant and Prestige was still fairly viable. Prestige continued to use Appellant as 
its agent. (Ex. P-24) Notwithstanding Appellant's refusal to pay the deposits for Prestige, 
Appellant had successfully completed all of its obligations as a broker by successfully nego-
tiating the terms of the charter agreement between Respondent and Prestige. (R. 822) 
On June 16, 1973, Respondent (Mansfield) left Salt Lake City and went to Chicago, Illinois 
to meet directly with Prestige. (R. 822, 823) Prestige executed the charter contract and five 
days thereafter mailed a check in the amount of $13,500.00 representing the deposits directly 
to Respondent. (R. 823) After some routine modifications with respect to departure points, 
14 of the 18 flights originally contracted as Chain "C" were operated and flown at a total 
charter price of $432,912.32. (R. 823; Ex. P-50) 
Respondent paid Appellant no commission for negotiating and selling the Chain "C" 
flights. Rather, Respondent entered into an arrangement with Prestige whereby the 5% com-
mission went directly to Prestige. (R. 824; Tr. 318) 
4. Chain "D" Transaction 
In April and May of 1973, Prestige requested Appellant to negotiate charter contracts for 
a series of charter flights to be flown to Munich, Germany during the summer/fall o( 1974. 
(R. 825) 
Appellant forwarded the Prestige request to a number of airlines, including Respondent. 
(R. 825) Pursuant to Appellant's request, Respondent mailed price quotations to Appellant 
on July 10, 1973 for the Prestige flights to Munich. (R. 825; Ex. P-23) 
On July 18, 1973, Prestige telephoned Appellant to request certain modifications in the 
series of Munich flights. Prestige confirmed the telephone call in a letter. (R. 826; Ex. P-24) 
On July 20, 1973, Appellant telephoned Respondent to double check the bids for the modified 
Munich dates. However, Respondent responded that it would not give Appellant quotes for 
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the modified series of flights to Munich. (R. 826) Respondent then wrote to Appellant stating 
in part: 
Per my telcon with Sharon, I did not quote the Prestige trips because they have 
also requested them from several other agents, and I don't want to be a shill at 
the auction. 
(Ex. P-27) 
Only ten days after the above-described letter, Respondent (Mansfield) went directly to 
Prestige to bid on the same charter flights to Munich. (R. 827) During those negotiations with 
Prestige, Respondent told Prestige that Respondent would not even transmit the quotes to 
Appellant. (R. 827; Ex. D-40) 
Respondent completed its private negotiations with Prestige without the knowledge or 
consent or participation of Appellant. (R. 828) Those negotiations resulted in a contract for 
ten charter flights to Munich. (Ex. P-49) Nine of these ten flights were actually operated. 
(Ex. P-50) However, the sales program of Prestige went better than expected and nine addi-
tional flights to Munich were added and flown as a part of the same program, for a total 
charter price of $1,135,117.20. (Ex. P-50) It is not unusual to have a program sell so well that 
extra flights are added. (R. 824) 
At the time the Chain "D" flights were consummated, Respondent already held $25,500 of 
money paid by Prestige as deposits for Chain "A" and Chain "C" flights negotiated by Appel-
lant. (Tr. 277, 278) Prestige utilized those same deposits as deposits for the Chain "D" flights. 
(Ex. P-30) This amount represented a "floating deposit" negotiated between Prestige and 
Respondent and was assigned to airplanes that Prestige would contract with Respondent 
from August 16, 1973 forward. (Tr. 275, 276; Ex. P-30) 
Respondent paid Appellant no commission for negotiating and selling the Chain "D" 
flights. Rather, Respondent entered into an arrangement with Prestige whereby the 5% com-
mission went directly to Prestige. (R. 828; Tr. 318) 
Prestige has continued to be a major customer of Respondent and has purchased several 
million dollars of charter flights in addition to Chains "A", "B", "C", and "D". (Tr. 125) 
Appellant makes no claim for any commissions on any subsequent charter flights or contracts. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT WAS THE PROCURING CAUSE OF THE SALE OF CHAIN 
"C" AND CHAIN "D" FLIGHTS FROM RESPONDENT TO PRESTIGE 
UNDER ORAL BROKERAGE AGREEMENTS AND A UNILATERAL CON-
TRACT WITH RESPONDENT AND IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT PUR-
SUANT THERETO AS A MATTER OF LAW 
The Statement of Facts clearly shows that Appellant's function as a travel agent within the 
air transportation industry is essentially that of a broker. The brokerage relationship has been 
generally described as follows: 
[A] broker is an agent who, for a commission or brokerage fee, bargains or carries 
on negotiations in behalf of his principal as an intermediary between the latter and 
third persons in transacting business relative to the acquisition of contractual rights, 
or to the sale or purchase of any form of property.... [Brokers] act as negotiators 
in bringing other persons together to bargain; generally, they ought not to sell or 
bargain in their own name, have no implied authority to receive payment, are not 
entrusted with possession of goods bought or sold, and have no special property 
or lien thereon.... 
Although a broker is broadly speaking an agent, the word "agent" is a broader 
term than "broker", more comprehensive in its legal scope, for while every broker 
is in a sense an agent, not every agent is a broker. A broker is distinguishable from 
an agent generally by reason of the fact that his authority is of a special and 
limited character in most respects. He derives his power ana authority to bind his 
principal from the instructions given to him by the principal. A broker is also 
distinguished from an agent in that a broker sustains no fixed or permanent 
employment by, or relation to, any principal, but holds himself out for employ-
ment by the public, generally, his employment in each instance being that of 
special agent for a single object, whereas an agent sustains a fixed and permanent 
relation to the principal he represents and owes a permanent and continued 
allegiance. A broker does not cease to be a broker because he may also in some 
transactions act as agent of either or both of the parties thereto. [Emphasis added.] 
12 Am Jur. 2d, Brokers n 1 and 3, pp. 112-11 A. 
When these general concepts of brokerage are compared with the facts of this case, it 
becomes clear that the travel agent, Appellant, was a broker or middleman for the purpose of 
negotiating charter flight contracts between the airline, Respondent and the charter customer, 
Prestige.1 There is an abundance of authority in support of the proposition that a travel agent 
1. In excess of 90% of defendant's charter flights are sold through travel agents. 
From 1967-1974 defendant spent approximately $2,793,000 in advertising. [Citation omitted.] Practically all of this 
advertising has been spent in cultivating travel agents. [Citation omitted.] 
In addition to the advertising program described above, defendant has a staff of approximately 50-60 full time personnel 
in the sales department including salesmen. The major effort of these salesmen is to visit travel agents and cultivate 
travel agents. [Citation omitted.] 
When salesmen visit travel agents, their purpose is to try to get the travel agent to utilize Capitol's services or go to clients 
and try to get them to form charter groups to be transported on Capitol. [Citation omitted.] The travel agent usually 
understands that there is a five percent agent's commission on charters; if not, the agent discusses the five percent 
commission program. [Citation omitted.] 
According to the practice followed by Capitol, the travel agent would locate a customer and participate in the negotiations 
ilnhilitv" (R 809-810^ 
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is essentially a broker and that the brokerage function may involve acting as agent for both 
the seller and the buyer in a business transaction if the parties are aware of and have con-
sented to such a relationship. See, Capitol International Airways, Inc., Enforcement Proceeding 
(Docket 16370), 46 CAB Reports 385 (1967); Levine v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 322 
N.Y.S. 2d 119, 122, 66 Misc. 2d 820 (1971). 
The Utah law with respect to brokerage generally is in acord. In Foster v. Blake Heights 
Corp., 530 P.2d 815 (Utah 1974), the Supreme Court of Utah said: 
It is not always true that a broker who is negotiating a transaction must be 
exclusively the agent of one or the other. He may well be a "go-between" acting 
for both. 
530 P.2d at 817. 
An excellent law review article has also noted that the brokerage function of a travel agent 
may involve acting as agent for both the buyer and the seller. Wohlmuth, The Liability of 
Travel Agents: A Study in the Selection of Appropriate Legal Principles, 40 Temple L.Q. 29, 45, 
52 (1966). 
In the instant case, Respondent was clearly aware that Appellant was acting in this dual 
capacity at the time Respondent entered into the oral contract with Appellant. (R. 816, 819, 
820, 825; Tr. 122; Ex. P-2, P-3) Therefore, the fact that Appellant may have been, in some 
respects, the agent for Prestige as well as the agent for Respondent does not detract from the 
contractual relationship between Appellant and Respondent. 
The law is clear that a broker is entitled to a commission on a sale made directly between a 
buyer and a seller if the broker operated under an agency or brokerage contract with one of 
the parties and was the procuring cause of the sale. The leading Utah case on this point is 
Frederick May & Company v. Dunn, 13 U.2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962). In that case, the plaintiff 
claimed a commission on the sale of certain corporate stock on which he had an oral contract 
to act as a broker. The defendant had sold the stock to a third party who had had prior 
dealings with both parties and who had been involved in negotiations for the sale of the stock 
with the plaintiff only as a potential financial backer for prospective purchasers. Negotiations 
with the plaintiff had always been initiated by the third party through the defendant. The 
plaintiff never offered the sale to the third party, but the defendant did. Based on these facts, 
the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. On appeal, the Supreme 
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[A\ broker must be the procuring cause in order to be entitled to a commission for 
such [a] sale. The cases use many different words in conjunction with, or in place 
of the words, "procuring cause" to indicate the necessary extent the broker must 
induce the sale in order to be entitled to a commission, such as "proximate cause", 
"actuating cause", "moving cause", and the like; all meaning about the same 
thing. Usually, whether the broker first approaches, or brings to the attention of the 
buyer that the property is for sale, or brings the buyer into the picture, has consider-
able weight in determining whether the buyer [sic] [broker] is the procuring cause of 
the sale. The fact that the sale was consummated without participation by the 
broker in the finalnegotiation does not preclude him from recovering his com-
mission if the sale was otherwise procured by him. [Emphasis added.] 
13 U.2d at 43-44, 368 P.2d at 269. 
The court then noted that the broker in Frederick May had not introduced the buyer and 
seller, had not offered to sell the stock to the buyer, never considered the buyer to be a poten-
tial buyer and that negotiations with the buyer as a financial backer were always initiated by 
the buyer through the seller rather than through the broker. Based on the unusual facts 
presented, the court held that the broker was not the procuring cause, and, therefore, affirmed 
the lower court's decision. 
In the instant case, it is undisputed that Appellant introduced the seller, Respondent, to the 
buyer, Prestige. (Tr. 122; Ex. P-2, P-3) It is further undisputed that Respondent spent nearly 
$2.8 million between 1967 and 1974 on advertising to travel agents such as Appellant and 
maintained a staff of 50-60 full-time personnel to solicit travel agents such as Appellant to 
buy Respondent's services or to act as broker for those services to clients for a five per cent 
commission (R. 809-810); and further that Respondent made continuing offers to travel 
agents to act as buyers and brokers for its charter flights which were communicated to Appel-
lant's principals. (R. 813) Such advertising has been characterized by Professor Wohlmuth in 
his article on the subject as a standing offer of a unilateral brokerage contract which is 
accepted when the travel agent brings the customer to the carrier. Wohlmuth, The Liability of 
Travel Agents: A Study in the Selection of Appropriate Legal Principles, 40 Temple L.Q. 29, 46 
(1966). 
With respect to the initial dealings between Respondent and Prestige, it is undisputed that 
Prestige, as a new and inexperienced tour operator, contacted Appellant in February and 
March of 1973 requesting that Appellant assist it in arranging charter flights to Jamaica 
(R. 815-816; Tr. 288); that pursuant to such request, Appellant obtained quotes from Respon-
dent for such flights, known as Chain "A" flights, and negotiated flight dates, points of depar-
ture, prices and deposits required in connection with the flights between Respondent and 
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Prestige (R. 816-817); and that Respondent entered into a contract with Prestige for such 
Chain "A" flights which was later modified as to schedule, such modifications being common 
in the charter business. (R. 818, 823-824) 
With respect to the Chain "C" flights, it is undisputed that in April and May of 1973 Pres-
tige requested Appellant to assist it in arranging the Chain "C" flights (R. 819); that Appellant 
was assured on at least one occasion by Respondent that Respondent would quote prices of 
Chain "C" flights and that Respondent would pay Appellant a five percent commission on 
such flights if the flights were sold and an agency agreement was executed (R. 819); that 
Respondent promised Appellant during the Chain "C" negotiations that Appellant would get 
the five per cent commission on any requests which Appellant initiated with Respondent 
which were later sold and that Respondent would not sidestep Appellant to deal directly with 
Appellant's clients or quote those clients prices net of commissions. (Tr. 42-43, 216-217) 
The undisputed facts further show that Appellant, in reliance on the promises of Respon-
dent, obtained quotes on Chain "C" flights and negotiated flight dates, points of departure, 
prices and deposits required in connection therewith between Respondent and Prestige 
(R. 819, 821-822); that particularly with respect to the negotiation of required deposits, 
Appellant was able to negotiate rates discounted 62% from the normal deposit required by 
Respondent to the benefit of Prestige (R. 822; Tr. 45, 275);that Respondent had not received 
any request from Prestige on the Chain "C" flights prior to receiving requests from Appellant 
(R. 819); that in processing the final paperwork for the Chain "C" flights Respondent twice 
formally acknowledged that Appellant was the agent for the transaction (Ex. P-47, P-52); that 
historically Prestige had always paid its own deposits (R. 818; Tr. 59); that as part of the 
merger negotiations between Appellant and Prestige, Prestige requested that Appellant pay 
the deposit on the Chain "C" flights or loan the money to Prestige to pay the same (Tr. 92); 
that the merger negotiations between Appellant and Prestige broke down after all negotiations 
were completed on flight dates, points of departure, prices and deposits required for the Chain 
"C" flights (R. 822); that after Appellant refused to pay Prestige's deposit, Respondent went 
directly to Prestige and executed the contract on the Chain "C" flights without concurrent 
payment by Prestige of the required deposits (R. 822-823); that Prestige thereafter paid the 
deposits which had been negotiated by Appellant on the Chain "C" flights (R. 822-823); that 
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the Chain "C" flights were later flown by Respondent on the terms negotiated by Appellant 
with routine modifications in schedules except that Respondent sold the Chain "C" flights to 
Prestige on a net basis, i.e., gross charter price less the amount of the five per cent brokerage 
commission (R. 823-824; Tr. 179-180); that Respondent did not require gross price payment 
from Prestige although it had earlier promised Appellant that it would do so and that Appel-
lant had asserted a right to the commissions on Chain "C" flights. (R. 824; Tr. 43) It is further 
noted that notwithstanding a claim that Mr. Mansfield, the Regional Vice President for Sales 
of Respondent, was confused during his testimony, it is clear from his testimony that where 
there is a dispute between the parties claiming entitlement to commissions it is Respondent's 
practice to not pay anyone until the dispute is settled. (Tr. 177) Obviously, the withholding 
of the commissions by Prestige with the consent of Respondent is a clear breach of Respon-
dent's practice. 
With respect to the original Chain "D" flights, it is undisputed that in April and May of 
1973 Prestige requested that Appellant assist it in arranging charter flights to Munich, 
Germany which became known as Chain "D" flights (R. 825); that Respondent agreed to 
quote prices on such flights to Appellant and to pay Appellant a five per cent commission if 
the flights sold and an agency agreement was executed by Prestige (R. 825); that Respondent 
promised Appellant on more than one occasion during the Chain "D" negotiations that 
Appellant would receive the five percent commission on any requests which Appellant 
initiated with Respondent which later sold and that Respondent would not sidestep Appellant 
to deal directly with Appellant's clients or quote those clients prices net of commission. 
(Tr. 42-43, 216-217) 
The facts are further undisputed that Appellant in reliance on the promise of Respondent 
that it would receive a five percent commission did obtain quotes from Respondent on Chain 
"D" flights which it communicated and negotiated with Prestige (R. 825; Tr. 42);that Prestige 
later requested that Appellant assist it in negotiating a modified schedule of flights under 
Chain "D" (R. 826); that Respondent refused to quote such flights to Appellant at a point in 
time immediately following Respondent's sidestepping of Appellant to close the Chain "C" 
flights' contract directly with Prestige (R. 826-827); that Respondent subsequently negotiated 
Chain "D" flights directly with Prestige (R. 827); and that Respondent modified its proposal 
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on Chain "D" flights so that it could meet lower bids which had been negotiated for Prestige 
by Appellant. (R. 827-828) 
Finally, the evidence is undisputed that Respondent created a unique deposit system for 
Prestige which allowed Prestige to utilize the deposits negotiated by Appellant on the Chain 
"A" and Chain "C" flights as a floating deposit for the Chain "D" flights and any future 
business between Prestige and Respondent (R. 822; Tr. 168-169; Ex. P-30); that the Chain 
"D" flights were later flown by Respondent on the terms which had originally been negotiated 
by Appellant with routine modifications in schedules and the addition of certain flights, except 
that Prestige was allowed to use the floating deposit and the flights were sold to Prestige at an 
amount less the 5% brokerage commission (R. 828; Tr. 179-180); and that Respondent did not 
require from Prestige the payment of the gross charter price although it had earlier promised 
Appellant that it would and Appellant had asserted a right to the commissions on the Chain 
"D" flights. (R. 828; Tr. 43) 
In the wake of such an enormous wave of undisputed facts, it is abundantly clear that 
Appellant was, in fact, the procuring cause of the sale of the Chain "C" and Chain "D" flights 
under the requirements of Frederick May. In fact, Respondent has never contended that 
Appellant was not the procuring cause of the sales of the Chain "C" and Chain "D" flights. 
There simply are no facts to support such a position and Respondent knows that that is the 
case. Yet, the trial court refused to make a finding on this material issue 
The undisputed facts also clearly establish that Appellant was operating under a brokerage 
or agency agreement with Respondent. This agreement was established both as the result of 
Appellant's performance by bringing Prestige to Respondent under the unilateral offer made 
by Respondent through its advertising, offering Appellant and numerous other travel agents a 
five per cent commission for acting as its agent in negotiating for the sale of its charter flights 
to clients of the agents (see, Wohlmuth, supra), and the direct oral agreements made with 
Appellant as a result of Appellant's contacts with Respondent concerning the flights for 
Prestige. 
Under Frederick May, Appellant is entitled to a five per cent commission on the Chain "C" 
and Chain "D" flights sold by Respondent to Prestige because Appellant was operating under 
an agency or brokerage agreement and because Appellant was the procuring cause of the 
sales to Prestige. In Frederick May, the court specifically determined that it is not necessary 
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that the broker participate in final negotiations or consummation of the sale to be entitled to 
his commission if the sale was otherwise procured by the broker. In the instant case, the 
signing of the charter agency agreement is obviously a mere formality of closing and the 
modified schedules are clearly foreseeable and simply matters of final negotiation. 
The Utah rule is generally recognized and accepted. In Abels v. Iceland Products, Inc., 
274 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1960), the plaintiff had served as a broker for the defendant under an 
oral contract for a five per cent commission through various business entities over the course 
of approximately four years. The defendant terminated the brokerage agreement and com-
menced selling directly to the plaintiffs customers. The trial court awarded commissions to 
the plaintiff on the ground that the plaintiff had been, prior to his termination, the procuring 
cause on certain of the sales made subsequent to such termination. There was undisputed 
evidence that prior to termination the buyers had been brought to the seller and the broker 
had conducted negotiations on the sales in question. The court held that, even though the 
total amounts of sales to be made had not been finally determined prior to termination and 
that with respect to one of the customers the prices were renegotiated after termination, 
plaintiff was entitled to commission on the sales made pursuant to the dealings in which he 
had engaged prior to termination. 
There is an abundance of case law on the subject of the right of an agent or broker who is 
the procuring cause of the sale in real estate transactions to a commission on such sale after 
the agent or broker has been circumvented by the buyer and seller. Unfortunately, it is not 
unusual for a buyer and seller introduced by a real estate agent or broker to attempt to "save 
the commission" by either feigning disinterest for a period of time and later consumiating the 
sale or by going directly behind the broker's back to consummate a sale at a price less the 
broker's commission or conclude such sale on slightly different terms. See, Tucker v. Green, 
96 Ariz. 371, 396 P.2d 1 (1964); Hiller v. Moore Realty Co., 483 P.2d 415 (Colo. App. 1971); 
Hanson v. Schletzbaum, 192 Kan. 265, 387 P.2d 176 (1963); Lindsey v. Cranfill, 61 N.M. 228, 
297 P.2d 1055 (1956). 
The principle that a broker who is the procuring cause of a sale is entitled to a commission 
has been upheld in a recent case in the Arizona Court of Appeals under facts strikingly similar 
to those in the instant case. In Mohamed v. Robbins, 23 Ariz. App. 195, 531 P.2d 928 (1975), 
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defendant promised that if a sale was made after the 90 day period to a buyer with whom the 
plaintiff was negotiating at the expiration of the agreement the plaintiff would still receive his 
commission. The plaintiff commenced negotiations with the highway department on the sale 
of the property. However, because of bureaucratic and procedural delays, negotiations could 
not be commenced in earnest until after the listing agreement had expired. The highway 
department informed the plaintiff that it could not negotiate through him as the broker unless 
he obtained a written authorization from the defendant. The defendant refused to give such 
an authorization. Nearly a year after the brokerage agreement had expired and following a 
series of negotiations between the buyer and seller, a deal was consummated without partici-
pation by the broker. The Court said: 
The dispositive question before us is whether plaintiff was the procuring cause 
of the sale... 
It is well settled real estate law that generally a broker who is the "procuring 
cause" of a sale under a listing agreement is entitled to a commission. [Citation 
omitted.] In the absence of a specific agreement to the contrary, if it can be shown 
that acts constituting the procuring cause occurred during the life of the listing 
contract, the commission has been earned even though the time provisions thereof 
may have expired prior to the consummation of the sale. [Citation omitted.] 
In Clark v Ellsworth, [citation], the term "procuring cause" was defined as 
follows: 
"[A] cause originating a series of events which, without break in their con-
tinuity result in accomplishment of the prime objective of employment of 
the broker—producing a purchaser ready, willing and able to buy real estate 
on the owner's terms." (Emphasis in original) 
The fact that plaintiff took no part in the concluding negotiations is immaterial 
as long as the procuring cause is gleaned in his favor from the evidence. [Citations 
omitted.] 
531 P.2d at 929-931. 
The court went on to point out that it was immaterial that the plaintiff was not present in 
the concluding negotiations and the consummation of the sale and that the defendant had 
rejected an offer of the buyer during that period. Under the facts of that case, the court 
concluded that plaintiff was the procuring cause of the sale. 
Without belaboring the point, the facts in the instant case indicate clearly that Appellant 
was the procuring cause of the sale of Chain "C" and Chain "D" charter flights to Prestige. 
Yet Respondent seeks to defeat Appellant's entitlement to commissions for those sales simply 
by asserting that Prestige refused to sign charter agency agreements after Appellant had 
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already initiated, and, in the case of the Chain "C" flights, completed negotiations. Chain 
"D" negotiations would no doubt have been completed had Respondent not refused to quote 
prices on the modified series to Appellant. Such a claim rings familiar to the seller's refusal 
in Mohamed to sign an authorization after the fact. Under the holding of Frederick May, 
Abels, Mohamed and a vast majority of the cases on point, it is clear that Appellant is entitled 
to its commission whether or not the charter agency agreement was signed by Prestige, 
whether or not Appellant participated in final negotiations or the consummation of the sale, 
and whether or not Appellant was terminated as the broker or agent prior to the consum-
mation of the sale because Appellant operating under a brokerage agreement was the 
procuring cause of the sales which were eventually consummated. Any other holding would 
be inconsistent with precedent and manifestly unjust to Appellant. 
POINT II 
THE CONDUCT OF RESPONDENT IN DEALING DIRECTLY WITH THE 
CUSTOMER (PRESTIGE) PROCURED BY APPELLANT CONSTITUTED 
A WAIVER OF THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE CHARTER AGENCY 
AGREEMENT BE EXECUTED BY PRESTIGE AND FURTHER CONSTI-
TUTED A BREACH OF THE BROKERAGE AGREEMENT AND AGENCY 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
Respondent contends that Appellant is not entitled to commissions on the Chain "C" and 
Chain "D" flights solely because Prestige refused to sign a document entitled "Charter Agency 
Agreement" in connection with such flights. The brokerage arrangement between Appellant 
and Respondent contemplated that the three parties (Appellant, Respondent and Prestige) 
would each sign Respondent's standard form brokerage agreement. (R. 819, 825) The apparent 
intent was that a separate charter agency agreement would be signed for each "chain" of 
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flights. The three parties did sign such an agreement in connection with the Chain "A" flights. 
(Ex. D-51) 
The refusal of Prestige to sign the charter agency agreement should not defeat Appellant's 
claim for a five percent commission on the Chain "C" and Chain "D" flights because: 
1. Respondent's Own Conduct in Dealing Directly with Prestige Prevented Execution of the 
Charter Agency Agreements. 
The undisputed facts in the instant case, as more fully set forth in the statement of facts 
and Point I supra, clearly demonstrate that Respondent hindered and prevented the perfor-
mance of the condition by dealing directly with Prestige at prices net of broker's commission 
and refusing to quote prices on Chain "D" flights as modified to Appellant. 
It is undisputed that negotiations on Chain "C" flights were completed during or prior to 
Respondent's meetings with Appellant in Salt Lake City, Utah in June of 1973 and that prior 
to such meetings Respondent had agreed to quote prices on Chain "D" flights to Appellant. 
It is further undisputed that after such meetings and in the middle of negotiations on Chain 
"D" flights Respondent immediately proceeded to deal directly with Prestige to consummate 
the sale of Chain "C" flights, refused to quote prices on the modified Chain "D" flights to 
Appellant and thereafter negotiated Chain "D" flights as modified directly with Prestige and 
consummated their sale. It is likewise undisputed that the prices paid by Prestige for Chain 
"C" and Chain "D" flights were net of the five percent brokerage commissions and finally 
that the five percent was withheld by Prestige without the authorization or consent of Appel-
lant and that such withholding was in direct conflict with Respondent's practice of holding 
disputed commissions until the entitlement thereto had been determined. 
There is only one reasonable inference from these facts, i.e., that Respondent gave Prestige 
the opportunity to bypass Appellant and to "save" the five percent commission on its dealings 
with Respondent. Thus Respondent by its actions and in violation of its promise to Appellant 
hindered and prevented Appellant from getting the charter agency agreements signed by 
Prestige. Respondent, in fact, gave Prestige an "incentive" not to sign the charter agency 
agreements. This "incentive" was the five percent brokerage commission which equalled an 
amount in excess of $75,000.00. (Ex. P-50) The "incentive" also included a unique deposit 
arrangement which would serve to reduce the "up front" flight deposit amounts cementing 
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a long term relationship between Respondent and Prestige. There is no question but that the 
deal was highly successful (Tr. 125) and that Appellant was effectively excised therefrom. 
Under such clear evidence of interference, hindrance and bad faith Respondent waived 
and excused the condition of signing the charter agency agreement and is estopped from 
raising the condition as a defense as a matter of law. 
It is by now a "hornbook" rule of settled law that a party to a contract cannot escape his 
obligations under a contract by claiming failure of a condition when it was his conduct which 
prevented the fulfillment of the condition. See, Concrete Specialties v. H. C. Smith Construc-
tion Co., 423 F.2d 670, 672 (10th Cir. 1970); Gridiron Steel Co. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 
361 F.2d 791, 794 (6th Cir. 1966); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. West Georgia National Bank, 
387 F. Supp. 1090, 1095 (D. Ga. 1974); Security National Life Insurance Co. v. Pre-Need 
Camelback Plan, Inc., 19 Ariz. App. 580, 509 P.2d 652, 654 (1973); Restatement of Contracts 
§
 295 (1932). The party taking such a position is regarded as having waived or excused the 
condition or as being estopped from raising it in his defense. See, Fowler v. Dana, 7 Ariz. 
App. 72, 436 P.2d 166, 168 (1968); Weather-Guard Industries, Inc. v. Fairfield Savings & Loan 
Assn., 248 N.E. 2d 794 (111. 1969); Cladianos v. Friedhoff, 69 Nev. 41, 240 P.2d 208, 210 (1952); 
Rogers v. Goodwin, 208 Okl. 110, 253 P.2d 844, 846 (1953). 
It is interesting to note that in Capitol International Airways, Inc., Enforcement Proceeding 
(Docket 16370), 46 CAB Reports 385 (1967), Respondent contended that it should be excused 
from its contractual obligations because the travel agent's conduct prevented it from perfor-
mance. 46 CAB Reports at 387. 
"Broker cases" such as the instant case often present a situation in which a broker has 
presented to a seller a buyer who is ready, willing and able to purchase. However, the broker 
is prevented from consummating the sale because the seller either refuses to sell or deals 
directly with the buyer in an effort to "save" the broker's commission. See, Abels v. Iceland 
Products, Inc., 21A F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1960); Weniger v. Union Center Plaza Associates, 387 F. 
Supp. 849 (S. D. N. Y. 1974); Mohamed v. Robbins, 23 Ariz. App. 195, 531 P.2d 928 (1975); 
Manzo v. Park, 220 Ark. 216, 247 S.W.2d 12 (1952); Hiller v. Moore Realty Co., 483 P.2d 415 
(Colo. App. 1971); Winkelman v. Allen, 519 P.2d 1377 (Kan. 1974); Lindsey v. Cranfill, 61 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
N.M. 228, 297 P.2d 1055 (1956); Bonn v. Summers, 249 N.C. 357, 106 S.E.2d 470 (1959). 
In Weniger, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York stated and cited 
the applicable principle of law very clearly: 
It should be observed, however, that even where the broker and seller expressly 
provide that there shall be no right to a commission unless some condition is fulfilled, 
and the condition is not performed, the seller will nevertheless be liable if he is 
responsible for the failure to perform the condition. [Citing cases.] [Emphasis in 
original.] 
In the instant case, the Court finds as a fact that the events specified in the 
payment provision of the brokerage agreement failed to occur solely as the result 
of defendants' conduct...Such being the case, defendants cannot now invoke the 
conditions precedent recited in the August 1967 agreement as a bar to Plantiffs 
claim. 
If a promisor himself is the cause of the failure of performance of a condition upon 
which his own liability depends, he cannot take advantage of the failure [Citations 
omitted.] "It is a well settled and salutary rule that a party cannot insist upon a 
condition precedent, when its non-performance has been caused by himself." 
[Citing a case.] "It is as effective an excuse of performance of a condition that the 
promisor has hindered performance as that he has actually prevented it." [Citations 
omitted.] [Emphasis added.] 
387 F. Supp. at 863-864. 
In Lindsey v. Cranfill, the New Mexico Supreme Court summarized the rule as it applies to 
the instant case when it said: 
We find the law to be that if the agent is employed for the purpose of procuring 
a buyer and actually puts forth effort about his agency, and procures a buyer to 
whom the owner later sells, and because of the fraud, wrongful act or bad faith of 
the owner it is made impossible for the agent to further pursue his efforts to bring 
about a sale, the agent is nevertheless entitled to the reasonable value of his 
services. [Citations omitted.] 
297 P.2d at 1059. 
It is clear that Utah follows these well established rules of law. See, Fischer v. Johnson, 
525 P.2d 45 (Utah 1974); Haymore v. Levinson, 8 U.2d 66, 328 P.2d 307 (1958), Curtis v. 
Mortenson, 1 U.2d 354, 267 P.2d 237 (1954). 
Whatever excuses or windowdressing Respondent may offer, the net legal effect is that 
Respondent fired Appellant in the middle of the negotiations. Respondent spent substantial 
sums in advertising to promote travel agents to sell Respondent's Charter flights. Nowhere 
did Respondent say in its advertising that it would quote on some flights and not on others. 
Nowhere did Respondent say in its advertising that it would deal directly with certain select 
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customers after the travel agent had made the introductions and commenced negotiations. 
Moreover, Respondent specifically agreed to give Appellant the price quotations for the 
Prestige account. ( R. 819, 825) 
The law is well settled that a broker whose employment is wrongfully terminated may sue 
for damages and is entitled to recover such prospective profits as would have been his but for 
the wrongful termination. Abels v. Iceland Products, Inc., 274 F. 2d 213 (7th Cir. 1960); 
Manzo v. Park, 220 Ark. 216, 247 S.W.2d 12 (1952); Bonn v. Summers, 249 N.C. 357, 106 
S.E.2d 470 (1959); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 455 (1958). In the instant case, Appellant 
is clearly entitled to commissions on the Chain "C" and Chain "D" flights. 
2. The Execution of the Cfiarter Agency Agreement Was Not a Condition But Was Rather 
a Mere Formality. 
If the execution of the charter agency agreement was as important as Respondent now 
contends, Respondent would have circulated the same to be executed at the beginning of the 
parties' relationship (i.e., before the charter contract negotiations began). However, the record 
shows that Capitol never produces the document for signatures before the charter contract 
negotiations. Capitol always circulates the document for signatures after all the negotiations 
for the sale of the charters are completed. (R. 811) The fact that the charter agency agreement 
is always signed after the broker finishes his work clearly shows that its execution is a mere 
formality. 
The parties did execute a charter agency agreement for Chain "A" flights. (Ex. D-51) How-
ever, Respondent did not request Appellant's signature on the charter agency agreement 
until eighteen days after the Chain "A" flights had been negotiated by Appellant and finalized 
between Prestige and Respondent. (R. 817) In fact, in transmitting the charter agency agree-
ment for Appellant's signature, Respondent stated, "[E]nclosed please find our agency agree-
ment covering the six Prestige Vacation charters to Montego Bay....We must have these forms 
in order to process your 5% commission." [Emphasis added.] (Ex. D-l 1) Respondent's conduct 
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with respect to the Chain "A" flights further demonstrated that it considered the execution 
of the charter agency agreement as a mere formality rather than as the essential condition 
and "binding event" which Respondent now urges the court to find it. The charter agency 
agreement was executed on Chain "A" flights prior to the time when Respondent and Prestige 
decided to cut Appellant out of the arrangements in late June or early July of 1973. However, 
in the Fall of 1973 after Respondent and Prestige had developed a close relationship, the 
Chain "A" flights had been flown and paid for and Appellant's commission was due and 
notwithstanding the fact that all parties had signed the agreement (Ex. D-51), Prestige 
instructed Respondent to "freeze" the payment of Appellant's commission. (R. 818; Ex. D-43) 
Respondent promptly complied and continued to comply, notwithstanding Appellant's 
demand for payment of the commissions, until suit was filed and settlement was reached with 
Prestige. (R. 818; Ex. D-53) Surely, if Respondent considered the execution of the charter 
agency agreement to be such a "binding" factor in the relationship with Appellant, it would 
not have obeyed Prestige's conflicting instruction. 
3. Enforcement of the Condition Would Result in an Unconscionable Forfeiture After Sub-
stantial Performance. 
It is well established that forfeitures are not favored by the courts Green v. Palfreymen, 
109 U. 291, 300, 166 P.2d 215, 219 (1946), opinion amended and rehearing denied, 109 U. 303, 
175 P.2d 213 (1946); and that a court is loathe to enforce a forfeiture. Swain v. Salt Lake Real 
Estate & Investment Co., 3 U.2d 121, 123, 279 P.2d 709, 711 (1955). This is especially true 
where the party that would forfeit all rights as a result of enforcement has substantially 
performed his obligations under the contract. See, Mackey v. Eva, 80 Ida. 260, 328 P.2d 66, 70 
(1958); 5 Williston on Contracts * 805, p. 838 (3d ed. 1961). 
Thus, the condition of having the charter agency agreements executed its rendered 
unenforceable because it unconscionably required substantial performance by the Appellant 
prior to its fulfillment and left its fulfillment at the discretion of a third party (Prestige) whose 
interests might then be, and in the instant case were then, in fact, adverse to those of Appel-
lant. Thus enforcement of the condition would operate as a total forfeiture of Appellant's 
rights after substantial performance. 
As more fully set forth in the Statement of Facts, supra, Respondent entered into an oral 
brokerage agreement with Appellant under which Appellant was to find a customer (Prestige), 
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to transmit bids to Prestige for charter flights and through negotiation of charter prices, 
schedules and deposits required on the Chain "C" and Chain "D" flights to secure the business 
for Respondent. Appellant was to perform these services, to bring Respondent and Prestige 
together in an arrangement that both could live with. 
It is undisputed that in fact Appellant did perform each and every term of the agreement. 
The flights were secured from Respondent and were flown as negotiated, contracted and 
agreed upon. (R. 823-824, 828; Ex. P-50) Then after the parties reached complete agreement 
on the terms of the sale and as an adjunct to consummate the sale. Appellant was to secure 
the execution by Prestige of a charter agency agreement as a final requirement prior to receipt 
of Appellant's brokerage commission. 
However, by reason of Respondent's direct dealing with Prestige, the agreement was not 
executed by Prestige because Prestige obviously had received what it wanted and no longer 
needed the services of Appellant and Respondent had received what it sought, i.e., charter con-
tracts representing in excess of $1.5 million of charter flights. Even more importantly through 
the manipulation of deposit arrangements and payment of commissions to Prestige, Respon-
dent would and did cement an on-going business relationship with Prestige. 
Appellant therefore submits that as heretofore argued in Point I, supra, Appellant is entitled 
to the commissions irrespective of the execution of the charter agency agreements because 
under the undisputed facts Appellant was the procuring cause of the sale of the Chain "C" 
and Chain "D" flights under oral brokerage contracts with Respondent and as such is entitled 
to the commissions as a matter of law. 
However, even assuming arguendo that the execution of the charter agency agreement was 
a condition precedent to Appellant's right to commissions under such brokerage contracts 
(which assumption ignores the unilateral contract and the oral contracts with Respondent 
which required no execution and further ignores Appellant's performance thereunder), 
Respondent waived that condition and is estopped from raising it as a defense because its 
unfair conduct in negotiating directly with Prestige during the middle of Appellant's nego-
tiations and allowing Prestige to purchase the Chain "C" and Chain "D" flights at an amount 
net of commission, prevented the condition from being fulfilled. Furthermore, the execution 
of the agreement must have been a formality or the condition itself is rendered unenforceable 
because it requires forfeiture after substantial performance. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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POINT III 
RESPONDENT CANNOT AVOID LIABILITY TO APPELLANT FOR COM-
MISSIONS DUE APPELLANT UNDER THE REGULATIONS OF THE CIVIL 
AERONAUTICS BOARD 
That the judgment rendered by the court on September 22, 1975 (R. 846-847), was based 
in part upon a consideration by the court of Rules and Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics 
Board is clear upon a reading of the judgment itself and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law made and entered by the court on September 11, 1975. (R. 797-804) 
Indeed, the Court found that under the regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board, Appel-
lant may not recover from Respondent because there is no written agreement between them 
(Conclusion of Law VI [R. 803]), and that notwithstanding the testimony of Mr. DeBry, an 
officer of Appellant, that Appellant is not directly regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Board 
(Tr. 16), the Court found that the regulations promulgated by the Civil Aeronautics Board 
"...are binding on Plaintiff (Appellant) and Defendant (Respondent)". (Conclusion of Law 
IV [R. 803]) 
It is ironic that Capitol should rely on Part 208 of the Civil Aeronautics Board, Economic 
Regulations, effective June 21, 1973 (see, Federal Register, Vol. 38, No. 104, pp. 14274, et seq.,) 
to shield itself from liability for the payment of commissions to Appellant when the clear 
purpose of the Regulations is to place limitations on the operating authority of supplemental 
air carriers such as Respondent for the obvious purpose of protecting the public from 
unrestricted authority of the supplemental air carrier. Furthermore, in a previous case 
involving a charter flight dispute brought before the Civil Aeronautics Board, Respondent 
had contended that where the issues involved were of contract and agency, the issue should 
be left to the courts and decided, presumably, on principles of contract and agency law. 
Capitol International Airways, Inc., Enforcement Proceeding (Docket 16370), 46 CAB Reports 
385, 395 (1967). 
Section 208.31a of the Civil Aeronautics Board Regulations, supra, provides with respect 
to written agreements with ticket agents the following: 
Each agreement between a supplemental air carrier and any ticket or cargo agent 
shall be reduced to writing and signed by all the parties thereto, if it relates to any 
of the following subjects. 
(d) The charter or lease of aircraft. 
Federal Register, Vol. 38, No. 104 - Thursday, May 31, 1973, at 14277. 
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While it may be seriously questioned that said Regulation even applies to a broker such as 
Appellant under the facts of the instant case, assuming arguendo that it may apply, it is clear 
from the statute under which the regulations are promulgated that said Regulation does not 
apply in the instant case. 
While there is no question as to the right of the Civil Aeronautics Board to promulgate 
regulations to govern air carriers, XheFederal Aviation Program, 49 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1301, et seq. 
contains a specific statutory provision with respect to available remedies and provides: 
Sec. 1506. Remedies Not Exclusive. 
Nothing contained in this Chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies 
now existing at common law or by statute, but "the provisions of this chapter are in 
addition to such remedies. (Public Law citation omitted) [Emphasis added] 
49 U.S.C.A., Sec. 1506 
The plain language of the Statute clearly indicates that the Regulation cannot abridge or 
abrogate any common law remedy. 
There can be no serious question raised to the proposition that an oral brokerage contract 
is enforceable at common law and this is especially true where there has been full or partial 
performance of the same by a contracting party. 
The general rule with respect to oral brokerage contracts is statedat 12 Am Jur 2d, Brokers 
§
 41, p. 803 as follows: 
Statutes requiring contracts for the employment of brokers to be in writing are 
in derogation of the common law and should be strictly construed and interpreted 
in the light of the legislative intent promoting their enactment. The Courts will not 
permit such a statute to be used as an instrument of fraud. (Emphasis added) 
Undoubtedly relying on the language of § 208.302 of said Regulation the trial court found 
that as a result of the settlement of a suit between Appellant and Prestige, Appellant received 
from Prestige a sum of money which constituted at least in part commissions on the Chain 
"C" and Chain "D" flights. (Finding of Fact XV [R. 802]) The Court made and entered its 
conclusion of law based thereon that the Appellant may not recover from Respondent 
"because Plaintiff (Appellant) has already received commissions for the same flights." (Con-
clusion of Law VII [R. 803]) 
Section 208.302 of the Civil Aeronautics Board Regulations, supra, provides with respect 
to commissions paid by direct air carriers to travel agents, the following: Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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No direct air carriers shall pay a travel agent any commission in excess of 5 per 
cent of the total charter price or more than the commission related to charter 
flights paid to an agent by a carrier certificated to fly the same route, whichever 
is greater. 
Federal Register, Vol. 38, No. 104 - Thursday, May 31, 1973, at 14281. 
The trial court found that as a result of the settlement of a suit between Appellant and 
Prestige, Appellant received from Prestige a sum of money which constituted at least in part 
commissions on the Chain "C" and Chain "D" flights. (Finding of Fact XV [R. 802]) The 
Court made and entered its conclusion of law based thereon that the Appellant may not 
recover from Respondent "because Plaintiff (Appellant) has already received commissions 
for the same flights." (Conclusion of Law VII [R. 803]) 
The Civil Aeronautics Board Regulations do not direct the air carrier as to whom the appli-
cable commissions should be paid in the event of an existing dispute between the travel agent and 
its customers as to the right to receive such commissions. 
Respondent is attempting to shield itself from liability to Appellant in reliance on such regu-
lations where there was an admitted dispute as to Appellant's claim for commissions on the 
Chain "C" and Chain "D" flights. This position was argued by Respondent notwithstanding the 
testimony of Mr. Mansfield, Regional Vice President of Sales, that where a dispute has arisen 
between two parties as to their entitlement to commissions that Respondent doesn't "pay anyone 
until the dispute is settled". (Tr. 177) Rather than following Respondent's normal, usual business 
practice in that regard, Respondent permitted the deduction of the five per cent commission on 
the Chain "C" and Chain "D" flights by Prestige. (R. 823-824, 828; Tr. 179-180) 
The Record in the instant case is absolutely devoid of any factual support for the conclusion 
of law made and entered by the trial court. In fact, the Stipulation of the parties filed with the 
court with respect to the Chain "C" flights and the Chain "D" flights provides that "Prestige 
deducted the five per cent commission from monies collected from charterers and nothing 
was paid by Capitol (Respondent) to Plaintiff (Appellant)." (R. 824, 828) Thus it is clear that 
Respondent did not pay commissions to Appellant and it is likewise clear that Prestige did 
not pay Appellant with respect to any of the flights in question, i.e., Chain "C" and Chain 
"D" flights. (Tr. 318) 
Assuming arguendo that Appellant did receive as a part of its settlement with Prestige 
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certain amounts representing commissions on the Chain "C" and Chain "D" flights, which 
assumption ignores the stipulation of the parties and the expressed language of the Release 
between Appellant and Prestige (Ex. D-53), it neces sarily follows, even after the application of 
the regulations adopted by the Court as a basis for its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, that Appellant would not be precluded from receiving the balance of such commissions. 
However, the facts with respect to the release of Prestige by Appellant as evidenced by the 
executed release between the parties (Ex. D-53), clearly reflects that such release was executed 
in connection with the commissions due on the Chain "A" flights (R. 818), for which Appel-
lant makes no claim against Respondent in the instant litigation and the parties so stipulated. 
It is further evident that the release was executed by and between Appellant and Prestige and 
Respondent was in no way a party thereto. 
To permit Respondent to shield itself from liability to Appellant based upon the regulations 
of the Civil Aeronautics Board would be to permit the Civil Aeronautics Board to usurp the 
function of the judicial system in determining the entitlement to brokerage commissions where 
a dispute exists between parties. Such a determination by this Court would likewise permit an 
airline to pay to or permit withholding of a brokerage commission by a customer without 
regard to such airlines contracts, legal obligations and without responsibility for such conduct. 
Certainly, the regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board do not contemplate such a result. 
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POINT IV 
THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ADOPTED BY THE COURT WERE NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT OR THE EVIDENCE AND 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SET THE SAME ASIDE AND THE JUDGMENT 
ENTERED THEREON OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR NEW TRIAL 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED 
On motion timely made and filed, Appellant moved to set aside the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and the Judgment entered thereon or in the alternative for a new trial. 
(R. 829-845) 
Certain of the Findings of Fact which the court adopted as Conclusions of Law to the 
extent that any of the same were Conclusions of Law and vice versa (Finding of Fact XVI 
[R. 802], Conclusion of Law X [R. 804]) were wholly unsupported by any evidence at the trial. 
With respect to Finding of Fact XV adopted by the Court (R. 802), as discussed in Point III, 
supra, there is a total lack of any evidence that Appellant received any sums as payment of 
commissions due on the Chain "C" and Chain "D" flights in connection with the settlement 
of the Prestige litigation or other wise. In point of fact, such a finding is directly contrary to 
the stipulation of the parties which stipulation states as follows: 
On 2/27/74 plaintiff and Prestige entered into a settlement agreement and a 
release was signed. A copy of that agreement is attached hereto and appears as 
exhibit D53 hereof. A copy of the release is attached hereto marked exhibit D53. 
On 2/27/74 the check of Capitol payable to Prestige and plaintiff in the sum of 
$7, 287.00 was delivered to plaintiff, which check represented the agent's com-
mission of five per cent of the sales price of the five flights operated as Chain "A". 
(R. 818) 
Furthermore, the evidence (including the stipulation of the parties) is clear and undisputed 
that the commissions on the Chain "C" and Chain "D" flights were retained by Prestige. 
(R. 824, 828; Tr. 178, 179, 180) As such, the adoption by the court of such finding and Con-
clusion of Law VII (R. 803) based thereon was clearly error. 
The court recognized the obvious problem in adopting this finding as indicated in the 
following discussion between the court
 a n c[ counsel during the argument of Appellant's 
motion: 
THE COURT: What do you want to do with finding fifteen then? 
MR. SESSIONS: I want to delete it. 
MR. CHILD: Oh, Your Honor, this is one of the legal theories upon which this 
case should be dismissed. 
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THE COURT: But not one upon which I base my findings. 
(Tr. 345) 
That the Court was uneasy with respect to all the findings adopted was further demon-
strated during argument as follows: 
THE COURT: These are the facts that you stipulated to and I have no choice 
but to adopt them as the findings of the Court. 
MR. SESSIONS: We agree. 
MR. CHILD: Right. 
THE COURT: They are probably a little more extensive than we would nor-
mally make but can't we base our conclusions on these facts? 
MR. SESSIONS: We certainly can base our conclusions on those facts. We 
disagree with the conclusions. 
THE COURT: I understand you do. If you didn't we wouldn't be here. Why 
don't we do that? 
THE COURT: No. I mean as a substitute. 
MR. CHILD: Oh, I think we need the findings of fact as entered also, Your 
Honor. They have been well thought out and they support any theories that are 
required. You see, the stipulated findings of fact were calculated in such a way as 
to express both sides' theories of the case, the facts that both sides could live with 
and they were not conclusive on the factual findings that the Court had to make. 
THE COURT: Well, are there facts included in your findings that don't appear 
in the stipulation? 
MR. CHILD: Yes. 
MR. SESSIONS: Yes. 
THE COURT: I see. 
MR. CHILD: That's why we had the trial. 
THE COURT: Well, then I don't know how to reconcile it. 
(Tr. 337, 338) 
Furthermore, the court's indecision with respect to the entire matter was indicated in the 
court's letter to Counsel of September 11, 1975 (R. 795) and statement at the argument of 
Appellant's motion. (Tr. 327) In the end, and notwithstanding the complexity of the trial and 
the issues presented, and further notwithstanding the stipulation of the parties which clearly 
prohibits the introduction of evidence which contradicts the facts as stipulated (R. 806), the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
court adopted the findings and conclusions (as modified and expanded by the stipulation of 
the parties) (R. 864-865), submitted by Respondent's counsel including Respondent's "asso-
ciated California counsel" (R. 794, 805), who not only did not attend the trial but had not 
even read a transcript thereof as the same was only later prepared. (R. 869) 
Appellant requested the Court to make separate and specific findings of material issues 
presented to and tried by the Court pursuant to Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, as amended, which states in pertinent part as follows: 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury... the court shall find 
the facts specially and shall state separately its conclusions of law thereon.... 
The first material issue concerning which the court declined to make and enter any specific 
finding as requested by Appellant was whether or not Appellant's activities in bringing the 
parties (Respondent and Prestige) together was the procuring cause for the Chain "C" and 
Chain "D" flights. (R. 834-835; Tr. 348) Appellant's complaint further alleges that because of 
Appellant's introduction and assistance Respondent has in fact sold many charter flights to 
Prestige. (See, Paragraph 21 of Plaintiffs Complaint, R. 360) These allegations, together with 
the testimony at the trial, raise the issue as to whether Appellant's activities and efforts were 
in fact the procuring cause of the charter contract and the flights flown pursuant thereto, 
which Respondent ultimately entered into with Prestige. The court, in denying Appellant's 
motion (R. 862-863), made and entered no finding on this material issue, notwithstanding the 
evidence adduced at trial and contained in the stipulation of the parties that the Respondent 
did not know of Prestige prior to the introduction thereof by Appellant to Respondent and 
further that Appellant conducted substantial negotiations, expended time and effort in nego-
tiation for the securing of the Chain "C" and initial Chain "D" flights, including negotiations 
for deposit reductions, without compensation or commission of any kind, as hereinbefore 
set forth. 
The court further declined to make and enter a finding of fact on the material issue of 
whether or not an agency relationship existed between Respondent and Appellant and 
whether or not Respondent in dealing directly with Prestige engaged in unfair dealings and 
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interference with the basic agency relationship. (R. 835-839; Tr. 348-349) 
The finding urged by Appellant is consistent with the evidence as to the nature of Respon-
dent's business. Respondent spent substantial sums on advertising and in addition employed 
salesmen, all for the purpose of trying "to get the travel agent to utilize Capitol's services 
or to go to client's and try to get them to form charter groups to be transported on Capitol." 
(R. 809) Such a finding is further material with respect to the modified series of flights to 
Munich, Germany, Chain "D", because the fact that the original four flights, dates and desti-
nations in Chain "D" were modified, revised and expanded to match the success of sales 
programs, is typical and anticipated. (R. 823) Finally, such a finding clearly raises the issue as 
to whether or not Respondent can deal directly with Prestige which had been procured by 
Appellant without liability to Appellant therefor and in so doing, whether Respondent has 
waived the condition precedent to the payment of commissions which it claims, to wit: the 
execution of the charter agency agreement. 
This court has considered the matter of the necessity of the trial court making and entering 
findings of fact on all material issues on a number of occasions. In Gaddis Investment Com-
pany v Morrison, 3 U.2d 43, 278 P.2d 284 (1954), this court, considering an issue raised in 
defendant's answer but with respect to which the trial court made no finding, stated as follows: 
It has been frequently held that the failure of the trial court to make findings 
of fact on all material issues is reversible error where it is prejudical. [Citations 
omitted.] [Emphasis added.] 
3 U.2d at 45, 278 P.2d at 285. (See also, LeGrand Johnson Corp., v. Peterson, 18 U.2d 260, 
262-263, 420 P.2d 615, 616-617 (1966). 
Notwithstanding the materiality of these issues which the record indicates is the very heart 
of the instant case, the court denied Appellant's motion (R. 864) which Appellant respectfully 
submits was error. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully submits that under the undisputed 
evidence Appellant was the procuring cause for the sale of the Chain "C" and Chain "D" 
flights between Respondent and Prestige. 
The conduct of Respondent in dealing directly with Prestige during the conclusion of 
negotiations for the Chain "C" flights and during the middle of negotiations for the Chain 
"D" flights and Respondent's refusal to quote the Chain "D" flights as modified to Appellant, 
constituted a violation of the agreement between Appellant and Respondent and further 
constituted a waiver of the condition that a charter agency agreement be executed between 
the parties. Furthermore, the execution of the charter agency agreement was in actuality a 
mere formality. Otherwise, enforcement of the condition would constitute an unconscionable 
forfeiture after substantial performance by the Appellant. 
The offering to Prestige by Respondent of not only the brokerage commissions on the 
Chain "C" and Chain "D" flights, the entitlement to which was in dispute but, in addition, 
the implementation by Respondent of a system of utilizing flight deposits negotiated by 
Appellant to cement the on-going business relationship between Respondent and Prestige 
constituted an unlawful hindrance to and interference with the brokerage and agency rela-
tionship between Appellant and Respondent and resulted in Appellant receiving no compen-
sation for services rendered in the negotiation and sale of said flights. 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court, when faced with the various interpretations 
of the findings of fact entered in the instant case, should have made specific findings on the 
issues of procuring cause and interference with the brokerage and the agency relationship 
existing between Appellant and Respondent and made applicable conclusions of law based 
thereon; and that the failure of the court to do so constitutes error. 
It is finally submitted that the findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the 
payment of commissions on the Chain "C" and Chain "D" flights to Appellant and that the 
Respondent can avoid liability to Appellant for such commissions based upon regulations 
of the Civil Aeronautics Board are wholly unsupported by any evidence adduced at the trial 
and have no basis or foundation in law. 
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The Judgment of the District Court should be reversed and judgment in favor of the Appel-
lant and against the Respondent in the sum of $21,645.62 representing the brokerage com-
mission on the Chain "C" flights and $56,755.86 representing the brokerage commission on 
the Chain "D" flights should be entered and Appellant should be awarded its costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JWATKISS&, CAMPBELL 
( yk^JwiJZ'Lt. 
GRflGOllY B. MONSON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Suite 400, 315 East Second South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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